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Some years ago a Wisconsin lawyer put to me this problem:
Client owns a drug store. He is retiring and has arranged to sell
the business to his former manager. The price has been agreed; the
buyer can pay half of it in cash; the balance is to be secured on the
property sold, and paid off in installments over five years. What kind
of effective security can the buyer give?
This led, at once, to questions as to what the property was. "Does
the store own real estate which could be mortgaged?" "No, it is in
a rented building and the rent is about what the property is worth,
so the leasehold would not be valuable as security." "Are there fix-
tures and equipment ?" "Yes, but they are not worth enough to be
security .... Are there single large items in the stock that could be
sold on conditional sale and released individually when, paid for, like
automobiles ?" "No luck. It's a thousand small items. You can't ask
a customer to wait for a release when he buys a tube of toothpaste."
"Is some of the stock in a warehouse, so that negotiable receipts could
be pledged ?" "Not much. Most of it is on the shelves or in the cellar."
"Are there accounts receivable? If so, he could assign them". "Only a
few. It's mostly a cash business." "Has the buyer got a house or
other outside property that he could pledge or mortgage ?" "He is
using that as far as it will go to raise the cash down payment."
So there we were. The remaining possibility seemed to be a
mortgage on the merchandise itself, with permission to the buyer
to sell items in the ordinary course of business and apply the proceeds
to make replacements, pay expenses and pay off the mortgage debt,
with new merchandise becoming subject to the mortagage in place
of what was sold. A perfectly sensible transaction and the client
thought a perfectly sensible security, but my friend the lawyer had to
tell him it was pretty sour.
*Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin; Chairman, Wisconsin Bar
Association Committee on Uniform Commercial Code.
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Why was it sour? This requires a little his.tgry.
Before 1887. In this period the law depended wlolly on the cases.
A mortgage of the sort suggested was ineffective as security for two
reasons:
(1) Permission to the mortgagor to sell the mortaged property
and to apply any part of the proceeds to anything except the mortgage
debt made the mortgage fraudulent in law, and ineffective against
general creditors,' and (2) any clause subjecting after-acquired mer-
chandise to the security was ineffective, since one could not mortgage
what he did not yet own.2
1887-1951. In this period the common law was supplemented by a
series of Acts3 (now 241.14, Statutes).
The first Act, that of 1887, apparently assumed, and correctly so,
that a mortgage of a merchant's" stock in trade was -valid although
the mortgagor remained in possession with authority to sell,- provided
all the proceeds of such sales were -to be applied, and were applied,
against the mortgage debt. -It added the requirement' of periodical
reports of sales and of additions. If these reports were not filed at the
time provided, the mortgage -became immediately due and payable,
and fifteen days thereafter ceased to be a lien except as between
the parties. These provisions remain in -force with changes in the
time and filing places of the required reports.4
The Act of 1895 changed the common law in an importaint respect.
It made the mortgage a valid lien on the property added to the
mortgage stock after the mortgage. The Act of 1913 limited this
to cases where the mortgag6 so provided. This -continues in the
present law.5 It is therefore clear that one of the old troubles of the
stock-in-trade mortgage no longer exists: an after-acquired property
clause is effective if the mortgage is otherwise within the law.
'Place v. Langworthy, 13 Wis. 704 (1861); Steinart v. Deuster, 23 Wis. 136(1868); Blakeslee' v. Rossman, 43 Wis. 116 (1877); Anderson v. Patterson,
64 Wis. 557, 27 N.W. 541 (1885); see Mortgages on Stock in Trade, 1947
Wis. L. REv. 453.2 Chynoweth v. Tenney, 10 Wis. 397 (1860); Mowry v. White, 21 Wis. 422(1867) ; see Chattel Mortgages on After Acquired Property, 23 MARQ. L. Ray.
80 (1939). The proposition that after-acquired property cannot effectively be
mortgaged seems still to be the law of the State, except in the particular
cases where statutes provide otherwise. Wisconsin Valley Trust Co. v. Hotel
Wausau, 214 Wis. 73, 251 N.W. 218 (1934); Kohler Improvement Co. v.Preder, 217 Wis. 641, 259 N.W. 833 (1935). Statutes which do provide other-
wise are e.g. Wis. STATS. (1951) §182.025 (public utility companies); Wis.
STATs. (1951) §241.14 (stock in trade), and Wis. STATS. (1951) §241.145 (2)(factor's lien act).
sL. 1887, c. 241; Wis. ANN. STATS. (1889) §2316 (b) ; L. 1895, c. 11; Wis. STATS.(1898) §2316 (b); L. 1913, c. 575; L. 1921, c. 49; L. 1925, c. 4; Wis. STATS.(1925) §241.14; L. 1927, c. 355; L. 1929, c. 525, §2; L. 1931, c. 291, §2;- Wis.
STATS. (1951) §241.14.
4 L. 1887, c. 241; Wis. STATS. (1951) §241.14, and the intermediate history set out
in footnote 3.
5 L. 1895, c. 11; L. 1913, c. 575; Wis. STATS. (1951) §241.14.
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None of the Acts say anything about the .application of the pro-
ceeds of sales to anything except the mortgage debt. In and after
1900 the Court concluded, in view especially of the amendment of
1895, that use of the proceeds to pay for replacements of stock, as
well as on the mortgage debt, was probably permitted. But the Court
has never gone beyond that. Any permitted application of the pro-
ceeds by the mortgagor to anything except renewal of the mortgaged
stock and payment on the mortgage debt brought into effect the
common law with all its rigor. The mortgage was fraudulent in
law, however honest in intention, and ineffective against other
creditors. 6
This was and is the trouble with any mortgage on a merchant's
stock in trade, except those covered by the Factor's Lien Act of 1951.
The merchant needs to run his business and to live and must somehow
pay rent, wages, taxes, heat, light, telephone and his own family's
bills; as well as cost of merchandise and mortgage debt. The mort-
gage creditor (unless the loan is for a very short period indeed) can
hardly avoid knowing that these other things are being paid out of
gross sales. If he does know and does nothing about it, he is likely to
be held to have consented. .And if he has consented his lien is gone.
So when such loans were made under the advice of careful counsel,
it was common to irequire the debtor to pay over his gross proceeds
every day or every week and loan part of them right back to him on
a new mortgage. It is not at all surprising that there was pressure
for a change.
Since 1951. The change came with the Factor's Lien Act of 1951.T
By that Act "any person .. . engaged, .. in the business of lending
or advancing money on the security of merchandise" may, by agree-
ment, take as security "a continuing lien upon all merchandise of
the borrower generally described in such agreement . . . regardless
of whether . .. such merchandise . . . shall be in existence at the
time of creating the lien . . . and upon any accounts receivable or
other proceeds resulting from the sale or other disposition of such
merchandise".. Notice of the creation of the lien must, of course,
be filed,9 and thereupon the lien "shall . . .be effectual upon . . .the
merchandise from time to time described in the written agreement...
6 Durr v.. Wildish, 108 Wis. 401, 84 N.W. 437 (1900) ; Ross v. State Bank of
Trego, 198 Wis. 335, 224 N.W. 114 (1929); Morley-Murphy Co. v. Jodar, 220
Wis. 302, 264 N.W. 926 (1936) ; Knapp v. Milwaukee Trust Co., 216 U.S. 545;
see Mortgages on Stock in Trade, 1947 Wis. L. REv. 453.
TL. 1951, c. 486; WIs. STATs. (1951) §241.145. The act follows a model enacted
in a considerable number of states. A "factor" under it is not the familiar
figure who sells another's goods, but "any person ... engaged . . . in the
business of lending or advancing money on the sdcurity of merchandise,
whether or not they are employed to sell such merchandise."
8 Wis. STATS. (1951) §241.145 (2).'
9 Wis. STATS. (1951) §241.145 (3) and (4).
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as against all claims of unsecured creditors of the borrower and as
against subsequent liens of creditors . . ." The agreement also oper-
ates "as an assignment of the accounts receivable which will result
from the sale and other disposition of the merchandise" as fully as
if an assignment had been perfected following each sale.'10 And
finally, reversing the existing law on the main point, "failure of the
factor to require the borrower to account . . . for the proceeds of
merchandise sold or . . . for moneys received on any account re-
ceivable resulting from the sale of merchandise" does not invalidate
the lien. 1
The Act follows a pattern which has become familiar in the law
of a number of states. 12 Its evident purpose is to make general liens
on fluctuating stocks of merchandise secure and this it does, as fully
as a State law can, in favor of some people. The strange thing is
that the people who can take advantage of it are so limited. They
consist of "any person ... engaged in whole or in part in the business
of lending or advancing money on the security of merchandise
whether or not they are employed to sell such merchandise." 13 This
includes banks, finance companies and old-fashioned factors who
make advances to their clients, but excludes sellers of merchandise,
or of the business itself (as in the case with which this paper started)
and persons who make an occasional loan but are not in the business
of lending. To all such persons the general lien of the Act is denied,
and they are left to the rigors of the prior law.
The reasons for the discrimination are not stated in the Act. The
Bill was, of course, proposed primarily by the benefited groups, but
we do not know why the legislature thought it wise to exclude so
many others from its benefits. It may, perhaps, be argued that the
exclusion denies the equal protection of the law to the excluded
groups. I do not now explore that question, since, if the Act were
held invalid, the result would not be to extend the new security to
those now excluded from its use but to deny it to everyone. Assum-
ing that the Act is valid, the present situation is that persons in
the business of lending money on the security of merchandise can
take valid and effective liens on a merchant's fluctuating stock in
trade, even though they permit the debtor to apply the proceeds of
'
0 WIs. STATS. (1951) §241.145 (6) and (9). The persons not subject to the lien
are purchasers of merchandise in the ordinary course of business (§ (5) (a) ),
like assignees for value of conditional sales contracts or chattel mortgages
made by the merchants' customers (§5) (b), unpaid sellers to the merchants
who take chattel mortgages (§5) (c), and holders of specific liens for
processing, warehousing or shipping (§6).
"2WIs. STATS. (1951) §241.145 (10) (c).
12 See Silverman, Factoring, Its Legal Aspects and Economic Justification, 13
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS 593, 602-603 (1948).23 H§(1) (a), (2).
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hii sales to pay his business and/or personal expenses, but that no
one else may do so.
The 1953 legislature has enacted the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act.14 This act will undoubtedly be useful here, as it has been else-
where, in the financing of dealer's purchases of automobiles and
other like goods which can be separately listed in a trust receipt and
accounted for when sold. But it has little practical operation in
situations that require a general lien on a fluctuating stock of numer-
ous small items with after-acquired merchandise included. For that
one must still look, in Wisconsin, primarily to the Factor's Lien
Act of 1951.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code.'5 If the Code should be
adopted in Wisconsin, the general lien authorized by the Act of
1951 would be made available, with some variations of detail, to all
comers.
Article 9 of the Code deals with Secured Transactions. Its general
philosophy, stated as briefly as possible, is that agreed security should,
within very wide limits, be legally secure provided others have a
reasonable chance to learn that it exists, either from public notice or
from possession by the creditor. In particular, the Code approves
and validates a general lien on a merchant's fluctuating stock and
gives the parties complete freedom to agree as to how the merchant
shall apply the proceeds of his sales. Let us see how this is worked
out.
In the first place there is wide liberty of contract.
"Except as otherwise provided by this Act or by other rule
of law or regulation, a security agreement is effective ac-
cording to its terms between the parties, against purchasers
of the collateral, and against creditors."18
In particular, after-acquired property clauses are effective. Sec-
tion 9-204 (3) says, with an exception not now material, that
24L. 1953, c. 490; Wis. STATS. (1953) Ch. 114; 9A U.L.A. 284 et seq.
15 All references to the Uniform Commercial Code herein are to Official Draft,
Text and Comments Edition, 1952. A few changes were approved after that
print by the American Law Institute and the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, and were embodied in the Pennsylvania Act of 1953,
but none of these are material on the points covered in this paper. They may
be found in a publication of the American Law Institute, "Recomnnendations
of the Editorial Board for changes in the Text and Comments of the Uni-form Commercial Code, Official Draft, Text and Comments Edition." June 1
1953.
The literature about the Code is large and growing. For present purposes
perhaps the most useful single thing, other than the Text and Comments
themselves, is Harold F. Birnbaum, Article 9-A Restatement and Revision of
Chattel Security, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 348. Mr. Birnbaum is also the author of
a forthcoming book on Article 9, to be published by the American Law Insti-
tute.
26 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-201.
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". .. a security agreement may provide that collateral,
whenever acquired, shall secure any advances made or other
value given at any time pursuant to the security agreement."
And it is not improper to permit the debtor to make sales from stock
and use the proceeds in any way the parties may agree.
"A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against
creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor to use or dispose
of all or part of the collateral ... or to collect or compromise
dispose of proceeds, or by reason of the failure of the secured
accounts ... or to accept the return of goods.., or to use or
dispose of proceeds, or by reason of the failure of the secured
party to require the debtor to account for proceeds or replace
collateral."'17
If this should be enacted much red tape now required will no longer
be essential for security. "Business and not legal reasons will de-
termine the extent to which strict accountability, segregation of col-
lections, daily reports, and the like will be employed."'"
When a" security of this sort is taken notice of it must be filed.19
The' interest is perfected from the time of filing or, if no advance
has then been made, from the time of the first advance under the
agreement after filing.2 0 When goods are sold, it continues as a
perfected interest in the proceeds if the agreemnt and the filed notice
so provide.21 When goods come in under an after-acquired property
clause the credifor's interest in them ranks from the same date as on
the earlier goods. 22
The resemblance of all this to the Factor's Lien Act of 1951 is
very clear. There are indeed differences in -detail, which have been
well spelied out by my colleague, Robert Skilton, in a schedule which
is reproduced following this article. Only three of these, I think, are
of much present moment.
(1) As previously stated, the protection of the Factor's Lien Act
is limited to persons 'in the business of lending money upon mer-
chandise. The Code provisions would be available to anyone.
1
7 UmFOM COMMERcIIAL CODE §9-205. See the Comment for the reasons for this
section.
'18 UNIFOR COMMERCIAL CODE §9-205, Comment 5.1 9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-302.
2 0 UNnORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-303, 9-204.
21 UNIFORM COM-MERCIAL CODE §9-306. The sentence to which this is a footnote
is a bald generalization, subject to various qualifications. The section cited
contains careful provision for different kinds of proceeds, which are dealt
with in different ways: It and the Comment to it should be consulted in detail.22 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-312 (1) and (3). These interests will not be
good* against buyeis of goods f;om the merchant in the ordinary course of
business (§9-307), certain purchasers of chattel paper (§ 9-308), holders in
due course of negotiable paper and the like (§9-309) and persons holding liens




(2) The Code makes substantial and, it is believed, sensible
changes in the procedure on default.23
(3) The Code tries, as the Factor's Lien Act does not, to deal
with the bankruptcy question that arises when after-acquired property
comes in under an existing lien within four months of bankruptcy.24
So far as liens on fluctuating stocks of merchandise are con-
cerned, the decision to enact the Code or not depends mainly theie-
fore on the answer to two questions:
(1) Should such liens, when agreed to by the parties and noti-
fied to the world by public filing, be legally effective against other
creditors?
(2) If so, should this be in favor only of persons in the busi-
ness of lending money upon merchandise, or of any lender or seller
who takes such a security?
II
ON AccouNTs RECEIVABLE
Financing on receivables has grown to a large extent in the
United States.
An old and very respectable form of such financing is by the
discount of trade acceptances. Seller ships a carload lot to buyer
under contract and draws on him for the price, at 90 days' sight,
bill of lading attached. Buyer accepts the draft, gets the bill of lad-
ing and receives the goods. The accepted draft comes back to seller
or to seller's bank. It is now a trade acceptance, two name paper,
eligible for discount and rediscount, and if the names are good is
worth very near its face. Sellers to good buyers have been financed
by the discount of trade acceptances for years.
The governing law is, of course, that of negotiable instruments.
It has been restated, and the statement greatly simplified, by Article
3 of the Code (Commercial Paper), replacing the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law of 1896. Changes in the law itself are few. The most
important change at this point, if the Code should be adopted, is that
the drawer of the draft will no longer be discharged entirely in all
cases if presentment for payment is delayed beyond the proper date
without excuse. He will, indeed, not be discharged at all by the delay
unless the drawee becomes insolvent during the delay and the drawer
"is deprived of funds maintained with the drawee .. . to cover the
instrument", and in that case "may discharge his liability by written
2 3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§9-501 through 9-507. And see Birnbaum, Supra,
note 15, 384-389.2 4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-108 (2), and comment thereto. See al'o Kripke,
The Modernization of Commercial Security, 16 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBLEMS183, 194-195 (1951); Birnbaum, Article 9-A Restatement and Revision of
Chattel Security, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 348, 357.
1953-54]
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assignment to the holder of his rights against the drawee." The
same rule will apply to the acceptor's liability if the acceptance is
made payable at a bank and is not there presented when it should be,
and the bank fails during the delay.25 This applies the substance of
the old law about drawers of checks to the drawers of all drafts, and
to acceptors of drafts payable at banks and makes the rule workable
in practice. It ought to make no change in the commercial or banking
use of trade acceptances.
Sellers, whose receivables are not merchants' acceptances but
consumers' notes secured by chattel mortgage or conditional sales
contract, also need financing and obtain it in large volume by as-
signment of the paper that they hold. Here the changes that the
Code would make are probably not of major importance. The Code
recognizes that in practice assignees of such paper sometimes take
possession of it, and sometimes leave it in the possession of the
merchant and permit him to make collections. Under the Code the
interest of the assignee may be perfected either by possession of
the paper or by filing,26 but, if it is by filing only, the interest is
perfected only against creditors of the assignor and transferees "ex-
cept a purchaser for new value and in the ordinary course of his
business who takes possession of the paper and who does not have
actual knowledge that the specific chattel paper is subject to a securi-
ty interest. '2 7 Under the Code, an assignee of such paper who did
not take possession but did file would need to stamp or mark the paper
with a clear notice of his interest, so that no one could thereafter
take possession of it without notice.
Where the receivables, which are the basis of the financing, con-
sist of open accounts or of sums to become due under an existing
Eontract, the Code makes an important change. Under existing Wis-
consin law, such accounts and sums to become due may be assigned
without notice either to the account debtor or to anybody else, and
if the assignment is in writing and for value it prevails over all sub-
sequent assignees and over every "future attaching, garnishing,
judgment, execution, levying or other creditor" of the assignor. 28
This is a surprising situation. A business, which borrows on its
least liquid assets (plant, fixtures, machinery, etc.) or on its chattel
property, must give notice to the world by filing in a public office;
but if the financing is on the security of the kind of property that
25For the old law: NIL §§70, 186; Wis. STATS. (1951) §§116.75, 118.62. For the
Code provisions, §§3-501(1) (c), 3-502(1) (b) and Comments to both sec-
tions.20 UNIFORM COMmERCIAL CODE §§9-302 and 9-305.
2
7UNIFORM COMMERaAL CODE §9-308. See also the Comment to this section,
which describes the going practice and the reasons for the provision.28L. 1945, c. 206, 528; L. 1949, c. 582; Wis. STATs. (1951) §241.28.
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leads most directly into cash, current accounts receivable, the trans-
action may be completely secret. One would think that a bank or mer-
chandise supplier, invited to extend credit to a business, would be
more interested in the state of its accounts receivable than in liens
on its fixed assets. But as the law stands, he must rely entirely on
the business itself for information as to whether its accounts and
contract rights have been assigned.
This situation the Code would change. Financing on accounts
receivable and contract rights is, of course, contemplated and per-
mitted by the Code and the interest of the secured party can be
perfected as fully as on any other kind of property,29 but it can be
perfected only by filing notice in a public office.30 If the Code should
be adopted banks and merchandise suppliers, asked to give credit to
a business, could find out from public sources whether or not its open
accounts receivable and contract rights had been assigned.
The decision to enact or not enact the Code, so far as receivables
financing is concerned, depends mainly on the answer to one ques-
tion: Should public notice of the assignment of the open accounts
receivable and contract rights of a business be required to make the
assignment effective against other creditors3' and later assignees?
2 9 UNIFORK COMMEnRCIA CODE §9-303.
SOUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-302, 9-305, and Comments to both sections.3 1 The only argument I have ever heard in favor of secrecy in receivables finan-
cing is that it is somehow regarded as an indication of a shaky financial po-
sition and may damage the firm's credit unduly if disclosed. I am convinced
that if this was ever true, it is not true today.
Trade acceptances have been sold to banks and eligible for rediscount at
Federal Reserve Banks for years. Surely the concerns which draw them on
their customers and sell them to their banks are not in disrepute.
For the newer, but now very large and reputable financing on assignment
of retail customers' paper, the automobile industry is the most conspicuous
witness. But it is not the only one. For other industries perhaps a single great
example will make the point sufficiently. The Statement of Financial Posi-
tion of Sears, Roebuck and Co., in its Annual Report for the fiscal year
ended January 31, 1953, p. 8, contains this entry on the asset side:
Customers Installment Accounts ......... $669,645,127
Less Sold to Banks .................... 225,199=23
$444,445,904
For financing on contract rights the witness is the history of prime contrac-
tors and their subcontractors with the government in World War II and since.






LIEN ACT OF 1951





Who may acquire Limited to those who engage in Available generally; not
lien on inventory the business of lending or ad- restricted to those in the
vancing money on the security business.
of merchandise.
Lien Act (1) (a)
Property subject "Merchandise" - defined as Inventory - broadly de-
to lien personal property intended for fined as goods held or
sale, either before or after being prepared for sale
manufacturing or processing, or materials used or
or in the process thereof, and consumed in a business.
excluding machinery, equip- 9-109 (4) -motor vehicles
ment, trade fixtures and motor not excluded-equipment
vehiles. Lien Act (1) (b) and fixtures may also be
included in the lien.
Nature of lien A continuing general lien on A continuing general lien
present and future merchandise on present and future
from time to time described in personal property and
written statements, and on proceeds thereof if' so
proceeds thereof, if so agreed. agreed.
Lien Act (2)
Kind of filing Statement of notice of the A financing statement is
required creation of factor's lien. sufficient. 9-402
Amendments of notice may be Possession by lender
filed. Lien Act (3) (a) (b). equivalent to filing. 9-305
Possession by lender equivalent
to filing. Lien Act (11)
Duration of Lien may secure advances Lien may last as long as
filing; time made for one year and for parties stipulate, to secure
during which additional yearly periods any advances made dur-
advances may covered by amendments. Lien ing that time. 9-403
be made shall expire 3 years from date
of filing of notice of creation,
unless prior to expiration,
lender files sworn statement
that" debt is unpaid. Lien Act
(3) (a),(b),(8)
Buyers in Purchasers for value in ordi- Buyers in the ordinary
ordinary nary course of business take course of business take
course merchindise free of lien, even free of lien, even thoiugh
though they know of lien. they know terms of lien.




If unfiled, void against credit-
ors. "If filed, good against all
unsecured creditors and sub-
sequent liens of creditors,
except specific- liens for
warehousing, processing and







classes. 9-303. If filed,
generally valid against
creditors. 9-303. Liens
for materials and serv-
ices take priority. 9-310
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Suppliers of Purchase money chattel mort- Purchase money security
borrower gage for' mirchandise filed interest has priority
within 20 days after receipt of over claim under after-
goods b'y borrower has priority, acquired clause if before
Factor's lien does not attach.to debtor receives goods,
merchandise supplied on con- the purchase money party
signment under- Sec. 24126. notifies lender. 9-312 (4)
Lien Act (5) (b)
Rights in Lien may attach to accounts Lien attaches to accounts
proceeds receivable r epresenting pro- receivable representing
ceeds" of sale of merchandise, proceeds of sale of col-
Lien Act (9). lateral. 9-306. Proceeds
Conditional sales contracts and consisting of chattel
thattel mortgages for part 'of paper: rights of trans-
purchase price may be. sold or ferees as governed by
assigned in ordinary course of 9-308; 9-306 (4). Special
business by borrower free of lien on cash proceeds.
factor's lien, even though pur- 9-306 (2)
chaser knows of lien.
Lien Act (5) (b)
-Effect of acts Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 Same. 9-205
of. dominion by (1925), rule in effect abolished.
'borrower Lien Act (10).
Additions to Possibility of voidable prefer.- Effort made to protect
inventory as ence as to additi6ns to stock such additions uider defi-
possibly voidable received within four months of nition of f'new value."
preferences under petition in bankruptcy if, at 9-108 (2)
60 (b) time of receipt 'of 'goods by
borrower, factor is charged
with knowledge of insolvency
and does not give new value.
Irving Trust Co. v. Commercial
Factors Corp. 68 F2d864(1934)
Use of lien to Very possibly excluded. Lien may be given for
secure antecedent Lien Act (2) 'antecedent debt.
debt.
Remedies Foreclosure, 'as in case of Spelled out in detail,
chattel mortgage, or in such with certain compulsory
other manner as may be agreed, requirements. Part 5
Lien Act (7)
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